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Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol

Item

Title
Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol
Abstract/Description
Formal theories of rational choice suggest that information about the possible consequences of alternative actions will be sought and used only if the precision, relevance, and reliability of the information are compatible with its cost. Empirical studies of information in organizations portray a pattern that is hard to rationalize in such terms. In particular, organizations systematically gather more information than they use, yet continue to ask for more. We suggest that this behavior is a consequence of some ways in which organizational settings for information use differ from those anticipated in a simple decision-theory vision. In particular, the use of information is embedded in social norms that make it highly symbolic. Some of the implications of such a pattern of information use are discussed.
Author/creator
Feldman, Martha S.
March, James G.
Date
1981
In publication
Administrative Science Quarterly
Volume
26
Issue
2
Pages
171-186
Resource type
en Research/Scholarly Media
Resource status/form
en Published Text
Scholarship genre
en Synthesis/Overview
Open access/full-text available
en No
Peer reviewed
en Yes
ISSN
0001-8392
DOI
10.2307/2392467
URL
Official Publisher's Webpage (JSTOR)
Citation
Feldman, M. S., & March, J. G. (1981). Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(2), 171–186. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392467
Cited in
Cross-Sector Research on Continuous Learning and Improvement
Item sets
OB Citations - Cross-Sector Research on Learning and Improvement

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